Marx's "phenomenology" of value by Main, Edward
MARX'S "PHENOMENOLOGY" OF VALUC 
Edward Main 
One of Marx's Economic and Philosophic Manu-
scripts of lBIM is a short paper entitled "Private 
Property and Labor" in which Marx attempts to account 
for the realization that labor is the "subjective 
essence" of private property and labor. In brief, 
what Marx attempts is a history of the emergence of the 
labor theory of value. Both Marx's persistent claim 
that what he is talking about is a "subjective essence" 
and the curiously neat division into three stages by 
which he discusses that emergence (Mercantilism, the 
Physiocrats, and Adam Smith) led me to suspect that 
there was something of an Hegelian dialectic at work 
here, and, more specifically, that an analogy could be 
drawn to Hegel's use of dialectic in The Phenomenology 
of Mind. The claim I wish to make is that the Mercan-
tile system of economics corresponds roughly to the 
state of mind described as "consciousness" in Hegel's 
The Phenomenology of Mind in that the mercantile 
economists 1) were unaware of themselves as doing 
"economics," but nevertheless 2) fostered a general 
policy that served the purpose of social unification 
(that is, no policy of that period was justified by 
appeal to a general theory of Mercantile economics; 
in spite of that, there was policy, and it was 
"economic"). The Physiocrats represent the position 
Hegel called "self-consciousness" in that 1) the 
Physiocrats were the first writers on economic topics 
who were aware that what they wrote was economic 
theory, and 2) they were aware of the role of labor 
in producing wealth but did not fully understand it. 
Adam Smith, then, would correspond to the third 
general position in Hegel's Phenomenology, "reason," 
in that he was fully aware of labor as the sole source 
of wealth; his identification of labor and wealth 
corresponds to Hegel's identification of subject and 
substance. Thus, what I am attempting in this article 
is, first, an interpretation of an article by Marx, 
and, second, an exercise in the application of dialectic 
to the history of ideas. 
I propose to approach this topic in the following 
manner: first, I will present a general discussion 
of the dialectic as it is used in Hegel's Phenomenology. 
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Second, I will discuss each of the three economic 
positions independently of either Hegel's or Marx's 
system. Third, I will present Marx's interpretation 
of these three economic positions in light of the 
general characteristics of the moments in Hegel's 
dialectic. Whereas the discussion of Hegel's dialectic 
will occupy a section of its own (in order to develop 
the terms), the last two sections will be somewhat 
collapsed in that after discussing Mercantilism as 
an historical phenomenon, I will proceed to a dis-
cussion of Marx's interpretation of it, then discuss 
the Physiocrats, MarxTs interpretation, etc. 
As it appears in The Phenomenology of Mind, the 
dialectic is a process of externalization and return 
to inner immediacy. In general, the first moment in 
a dialectical development is an immediate intuition 
constituted by the act of the mind in thinking it. It 
is, in a sense, a given in that there is no justifica-
tion for it (justification would be mediation) other 
than its presence, its appearance in the mind. It is 
"being-in-itself," i.e., the mind as thinking, but 
passive in that the mind is not aware of its own 
activity, but sees itself as taking rather than making 
its content. 
. . , the positive existence of mind qua 
primary and ultimate, is nothing but the 
immediate aspect of mind, the beginning; 
the beginning, but not yet its return to 
itself. The characteristic feature dis-
tinguishing this part of science [Phenomen-
ology] from the others is the element of 
immediate existence,! 
The general section of The Phenomenology of Mind 
entitled "consciousness" represents, xn general, this 
first moment. Consciousness is not self-consciousness 
(yet); the mind is aware, but not of itself. "Con-
sciousness" itself, however, also contains within 
itself a dialectic, the first moment of which is 
"sense-certainty;" the stance of certainty reflects 
passive acceptance and uncritical immediacy. As Hegel 
develops it, this position of sense-certainty likewise 
contains a dialectic issuing from the immediacy of 
the "this." The abstracted recurring characteristic 
of the "first moment" in a dialectical development is 
this attitude of passive immediacy by the mind regarding 
its content. It is important to realize that this 
passivity of the mind is how the mind sees itself, for, 
as we shall see, the mind is, in reality, active. The 
important element is that of immediacy, the identity of 
the mind with itself; it is the element of passivity 
that is the source for the transition to the second 
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moment. 
This passivity of the first moment is untenable, 
for it rests on a contradiction. The mind regards 
itself as passive, but in fact it is active* Simple 
consciousness is thinking; certainty is made by the 
act of taking-for-granted, and the "this" is located 
by the mind. The truth will out, and when the mind 
discovers the fact of its own activity, it realizes 
that its content (that of which it is aware) is its 
own creation and that, therefore, the activity of the 
mind is the object it knows. If the first moment is 
characterized by passive immediacy, the second moment 
is characterized by active transcendence« The mind 
separates itself from itself; it becomes "being-for-
itself." It is "for-itself" in that it is its own 
object, it looks upon its own activity as an "other." 
Consciousness becomes self-consciousness. 
Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing 
but what falls within its experience; for what 
is found in experience is merely spiritual 
substance, and, moreover, object of its self. 
Mind, however, becomes object, for it consists 
in the process of becoming an other to itself, 
i.e., an object for its own self,.and in 
transcending this otherness.2 
This transition is effected by negation ("the factor of 
negativity"). The negation involved is the rejection 
of pure immediacy alone as constituting mind. Con-
sciousness is a state of mind, but not the most perfect 
state of mind (although there are no states of mind 
without consciousness); the movement from the first 
moment to the second (at least) derives from the 
inadequacy of immediate apprehension to constitute the 
whole of consciousness. 
But if the second moment is the negation of 
immediacy as the sole constituent of mind, it is also 
the positing of transcendence as capturing the essence 
of mind, an equally untenable position if taken ex-
clusively. The transcendence of mind is realized as 
a reaction against passive immediacy, and without that 
immediacy there is nothing to transcend. The tran-
scendence of mind is essentially reflexive (although 
this may not as yet be realized by the mind); it is 
for itself, yet the stance mind takes in that position 
is that mind (as object) is other than itself, a contra-
diction as devastating to the second moment as the 
assertion of passivity is to the first. 
The first two moments (immediacy and transcend-ence; being-in-itself and being-for-itself) thus 
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emerge as opposites, maintained by a tension of self-
denial effected by the internal contradiction of the 
other moment; the second moment is the denial of 
passivity in the first moment, and likewise the first 
moment becomes the denial of the mind's otherness to 
itself asserted by the second moment). The first and 
second moments negate each other, yet they also entail 
each other. The mind impels itself from one moment 
to the other by the "contradictions" (or "oppositions") 
in each. The third moment, negatively put, is the 
negation of this mutual negation maintained by the 
first two moments (the third moment does not negate 
the first two moments in the same sense that the 
second moment negates the first; what the third 
moment does is to deny the incompatibility of the first 
two moments). Positively, the third moment is the 
recognition of the mutual dependence of the first 
two moments on each other and the maintenance of the 
truth each realized. The third moment reasserts 
the self-identity of the mind; as being-in-itself-and-
for-itself, it recognizes that mind is its own proper 
object, but denies that this entails mind being other 
than itself; it reasserts the immanence of mind to 
itself, but denies that this self-identity entails 
passivity. In the third moment, subject and object 
are not taken as mutually exclusive. Subject and 
object imply each other: the object is constituted 
by its delineation by a subject, and the subject is 
constituted by its delineation of an object. Each 
(subject and object) is the necessary condition of the 
other. Hind as object requires mind as subject, and 
vice versa. 
Having discussed the nature of the dialectic as 
it appears in Hegel's Phenomenology, I shall now 
proceed to my next task~ü There is an immediate 
problem posed by a discussion of Mercantilism; it never 
existed. Mercantilism was not an "ism," nor was the 
Mercantile system a "system." "The Mercantile System" 
was a phrase coined by Adam Smith to describe an 
historical set of certain governmental policies 
oriented towards the regulation of commerce; the word 
"Mercantilism" was first used by Gustav Schmoller, a 
German historian, in his book, The Mercantile System 
in Germany, published in 1881. Historians, neverthe-
Xiss, have found the terms useful and accurate fox1 an 
understanding of certain general trends in the govern-
mental policies of sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and 
eighteenth-century Europe. 
Among the general trends that characterize 
Mercantile economics are, first, governmental regula-
tion of commerce, which by itself reveals a realization 
of the importance of economic activity, and, secondly, 
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that these regulations were to promote, not so much 
commerce per se, but the centralized power of the 
state. These two trends, in turn, were based upon two 
assumptions: first, wealth means power; this assump-
tion in itself could have produced both of the above 
mentioned trends: since the main concern was for the 
power of the centralized government, an increase in 
power required an increase in wealth, which directs 
attention toward economics as the means of obtaining 
wealth. Second, there is only a finite amount of 
wealth to be had at any one time, and therefore, the 
increase in wealth by any one state entails the 
proportional impoverishment of other states. The 
chief effect of Mercantile policy was the unification 
of the state, that is to say, the unification of 
society as a whole, as an economic whole united by 
economic policy. 
Due to the absence of a "school" of Mercantile 
economics, there was some variation in the specific 
legislation and policies put into effect from country 
to country. Sinoe Marx refered to the essentially 
French Physiocratic school of economics (as the 
successor to Mercantilism) , I will discuss a French 
Mercantilist Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Colbert was 
the primary minister of Louis XIV, and it was he who 
directed the government while Louis occupied himself 
with his wars and building Versailles. In a letter 
Colbert sent Louis in 1670 on government revenue, he 
discussed policies that are archetypically Mercantil-
ist. Although the letter is chiefly concerned with 
specific actions to be taken, Colbert does wax theoreti-
cal often enough for the assumptions behind his 
policies to emerge. Ue notes that the revenues of the 
government are directly proportional to the sum total 
of money present in the kingdom, and that continuous 
taxation without an increase in that sum total of money 
would decrease governmental revenue. If a man has one 
hundred dollars, a ten percent tax provides ten dollars 
for the government and leaves the man with ninety; the 
next year, however, the same ten percent tax on the 
remaining ninety dollars would yield only nine dollars 
in governmental revenue, leaving the man with eighty-
one, and so on. fie concludes that to safeguard 
governmental income, there must be a constant increase 
in the total amount of wealth present in the nation. 
From this a clear and obvious conclusion 
may be drawn: that both the soundness of the 
Finances and the increase of Your Majesty's 
revenues depend upon increasing by every 
possible means the quantity of coin cir-
culating within the realm , . . , 3 
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To secure this increasing wealth for the nation, he 
proposed policies designed, externally, to deprive 
foreigners (chiefly the Dutch) of the benefits of 
shipping (by severely taxing the cargo of foreign 
vessels and increasing France's own merchant fleet), 
and, internally, to promote trade within France by 
abolishing taxes on river shipping. 
I mention these policies in order to demonstrate 
two points: first, in Mercantilism, society was 
assumed to be a unified whole; second, society has as 
its proper object, the object of governmental policy, 
the accumulation of wealth. Nevertheless, this wealth 
is external to the society which acquires it. Wealth 
is not a product of that society. It is this assump-
tion, the separation of society and the wealth it 
acquires, that forms an analogy to the first moment 
of Hegel's dialectic. The first moment was character-
ized by the "givenness" of the object of knowledge to 
mind (immediacy) and the self-identity (unity) of 
mind. The state is likewise self-identical; it is 
assumed to be an interrelated whole, and the destruc-
tion of internal barriers was one aspect of Mercantile 
policy. Nevertheless, money ("precious metals" for 
Marx) is uncritically identified as wealth; money, as 
value, is "given." Money is wealth-in-itself, it is 
valuable because money is valuable. Society is 
likewise "in-itself;" it is a whole which is passive 
before wealth in that it does not create wealth, it 
merely acquires it, in the same sense that, in "con-
sciousness," the mind does not see itself as creating 
its objects, but merely as receiving them. 
Likewise, the fact that Mercantilist theoreti-
cians were not aware of themselves as proposing a 
general theory of economics (they merely recommended 
certain specific policies), but nevertheless did 
discover the vital role economics plays in society, 
is the source of another analogy to the first moment 
of Hegel's dialectic. They did economics, they were 
conscious economically, but they were not conscious 
of economics. They were not self-conscious; they were 
concerned with the immediate activity of doing economics, 
but they had not considered the ramifications of 
identifying society as economic activity (in fact, 
Colbert considered his policies supportive, rather 
than constitutive, of society and government). 
Nevertheless, just as it was eventually realized 
that consciousness is an activity and in fact makes 
its objects, so it was realized that commerce is an 
activity and, if not actually creating wealth, is an 
activity that enriches the nation. It is precisely 
the Mercantilist notion that wealth is to he found 
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outside the nation (it must, if it is to increase the 
sum of wealth in the nation) that was the focus for 
the Physiocrats' criticism. Just as the objects of 
mind are not other than the mind, so, for the Physio-
crats, the wealth of the nation is not to be sought 
outside the nation* 
The "Physiocrats" were so named because their 
basic position was one of the "rule of nature;" it was 
from them that the phrase "laissez faire, laissez 
passer" originally came. They held the position that 
the best economic policy was one that derived from 
each individual's natural right to property and which 
did nothing to interfere with that right. Francois 
Quesnay was once asked what he would do if he were 
king; his answer was "nothing." The Physiocrats 
represent the first self-proclaimed "school" of 
economics, one that — true to the spirit of the 
Enlightenment — sought to locate the principles of 
natural law at work in economics. 
Tha chief doctrines of Physiocratic theory were, 
first, that the regulation of the economy by the 
government be decreased or eliminated, and, second, 
that attention be focused on internal rather than 
external sources of wealth (i.e., the promotion of 
agriculture at the expense of foreign trade). Both 
of these suggest a continuation of the Mercantilist 
goal of national unification with the addition of a 
concept of national self-sufficiency. The nation is to 
fulfill its own needs; it is the source of its own 
wealth. 
The first principle, that of decreasing direct 
governmental regulation of the economy, derives from 
the Physiocrats' belief in the natural right to 
property; for the economy to function well, the 
individual must be secure in his property: "Car la 
surety de la propriete est les fondement essential de 
1'ordre econcmique de la societe."4 Only when the 
individual feels that his right to enjoy the fruits of 
his own labor will not be infringed upon, will he 
labor to produce those fruits. 
C'est la sürete* de la possession permanente qui provoque le travail et l'emploi des richesses A 1*amelioration et a la culture des terres et aux entreprises da commerce et de 1*Industrie.5 
Nevertheless, of these three — land, trade, and 
industry — the Physiocrats held that only cultivation 
of the land provided an expanding source of wealth. 
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Of all kinds of wealth, only the gifts of 
the land constantly reproduce themselves, 
because ordinary needs are always the same. 
Manufacturing only produces very little beyond 
the salaries of the men who are employed. 
Monetary transactions only produce fluctuations 
in a symbol that by itself has no real value. 
It is the earth alone that gives true wealth, 
whose yearly renewal assures the state of 
revenues that are fixed, independent of public 
opinion, visible, and that people cannot hide 
for their own needs.6 
Whereas the Mercantilists were concerned with procuring 
for the nation an ever larger proportion of a fixed 
wealth, the Physiocrats saw in agriculture both the 
source of wealth given by nature (satisfaction of 
physical needs) and a non-deple table, continuing 
source of such wealth. 
This natural, reproducing wealth can even be 
amplified by the scientific use of labor in intelli-
gent farming. It was at this point, however, that the 
Physiocrats, as Marx saw it, went wrong. In the 
Physiocrats, Marx saw the first realization of the 
role of labor in the creation of wealth. Unfortunate-
ly, they fell short of the full realization that 
labor alone is the source of wealth and still sought 
an external source of wealth in the produce of the 
land. 
All wealth is resolved into land and cultiva-
tion (agriculture).... Thus the subjective 
essence of wealth has already been transferred 
to labor. Hence, labor is not* yet grasped in 
its generality and abstraction: it is still 
bound to a particular natural element as its 
matter, and it is therefore only recognized 
in a particular mode of existence determined 
by nature.7 
Labor, any sort of labor, is not ipso facto considered 
to be productive of wealth, i.e., xt is not realized 
that labor is the general, essential element in all 
wealth; instead, wealth-producing labor is seen as 
being of only one sort — farming. Thus, Marx attempts 
to point to what he takes to be an internal contradic-
tion in Physiocrat!o theory — it both denies and 
affirms labor as the source of wealth. 
The land is here still recognized as a phenome-
non of nature independent of man — not yet as 
capital, i.e., as an aspect of labor itself. 
Labor appears, rather, as an aspect of the land.8 
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The relationship between land and labor is misconstrued 
by the Physiocrats (although, to their credit, they 
recognize that there is a relation) , and therefore, 
their attitude towards the role of labor in producing 
wealth is in error. Labor is seen as a qualification 
of land (an activity that qualifies, forms and 
directs, the land and its products), not land as a 
qualification of labor (labor can be qualified as farm 
labor, industrial labor, etc.), that is, it is not 
understood that farming is merely one particular form 
of the general wealth producing activity of labor. 
Labor is seen merely as the means by which men channel 
the fruits of the earth to themselves. Labor is not 
understood as creating wealth, but rather merely as 
gathering, acquiring a wealth that is still seen as 
existing independently of men. The role of human 
activity relative to wealth is recognized, and it is 
this activity that is made the object of policy. 
Nevertheless, it is an activity separate from that 
wealth; it is alienating in that the labor neither 
increases nor diminishes the value of what is produced 
(although it does affect the quantity). Instead, the 
labor is objectified as the gleaned product that alone 
is valuable* Wealth is not a simple given, an "in-
itself as it appears in the Mercantilist notion of 
wealth as precious metal; rather wealth is seen as a' 
wealth for man (i.e., food) , and that wealth requires 
human activity to acquire it. Wealth is thus, in a 
sense, "for-itself" in that it is known to be the 
product of human labor. Yet it is not an "in-itself-
for-itsclf in that labor per se, labor alone, labor 
in its generality, is not taken to be wealth. Instead, 
the labor that produces wealth is separated from men, 
alienated, and projected into the product. Though 
wealth is essentially the creature of labor, this 
understanding is confused and altered by the earlier 
Mercantilist conception to which it was opposed; 
agricultural commodities in the end merely supplant 
precious metals as the proper focus for labor (i.e., 
agricultural commodities as valuable in themselves). 
The recognition of the role of labor in agriculture 
both brings labor as a value-creating activity to 
consciousness and simultaneously abstracts from labor 
that self-same creative activity of which it is 
conscious. It is the fruits of the earth.that have 
value, even though that value is a value for men. 
This, then, is the intrinsic contradiction in the 
Physiocratic attempt to locate wealth-producing 
activity solely in the particular activity of farming; 
this conception (the value of labor) impels itself 
back to a Mercantilist conception with farm products 
taking the place of precious metals. Nevertheless, 
wealth is not "in-itselfa passive self-sufficient 
thing, rather it is the embodiment of an activity, a 
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"for-itself," that is productive of valuable objects. 
There is thus a need for a conception of wealth as 
"in-itself-for-itself,• a need fulfilled by Adam 
Smith with his attribution of wealth entirely to the 
products of labor, any labor. Only by thus generalizing 
the value of labor is the self-destructive tendency 
of any attempt to attribute wealth to the products of 
any particular kind of labor corrected. 
In many ways, the economic system devised by Adam 
Smith represents an intentional synthesis of the 
Mercantile and the Physiocratic positions. Smith 
rejected the Mercantile identification of wealth as 
money, but maintained the idea of trade as essential 
for wealth. He likewise rejected the Physiocratic 
notion that agriculture is the only source of wealth, 
but maintained their conception of a self-running, 
free trade economy. His main original contribution 
was a justification for industry as an equally valuable 
source of wealth as agriculture. By this broader 
conception of the value of labor, Smith sought to 
overcome a problem inherent in the Physiocratic 
formula: if agriculture alone is the source of 
wealth, how could anyone who is not himself a farmer 
offer a commodity of any value in return for the 
fruits of the earth. Here Smith reintroduced the 
concept of trade (ideally the exchange of goods of 
equal value) within the framework of a self-sufficient 
society. That is to say, Smith internalized the 
Mercantile notion of trade. Mercantilists had con-
ceived of a lop-sided trade by which a favorable 
balance of trade (more wealth, i.e., gold, entering 
a country than leaving it) would provide a constant 
source of new wealth within the country, insuring a 
constant tax base for government. In an argument 
borrowed from David Hume, Smith claimed that gold 
acquired in such a favorable balance only causes 
prices to rise (since there is more money in circula-
tion to buy things with) and that the balance then 
reverses itself on the next trading round (due to the 
higher prices). The stockpiling of wealth is a 
self-defeating activity. Money is not the measure of 
wealth, rather it is the medium of exchange and, like 
water, it seeks its own level. 
others admit that if a nation could be 
separated from all the world, it would be 
of no consequence how much, or how little 
money circulated in it. The consumable goods 
which were circulated by means of this money, 
would only be exchanged for a greater or a 
smaller number of pieces; but the real wealth 
or poverty of the country, they allow, would 
depend altogether upon the abundance or 
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scarcity of those consumable goods.9 
Smith thus stood the Mercantilists on their heads; 
trade is not in the service of money, money is in the 
service of trade. 
Against the Physiocrats, Smith argued that, 
although it is true that agriculture produces real 
wealth, if that constant amplification of wealth is 
to be meaningful, it is necessary to have a balancing 
source of non-agricultural wealth to use up the 
surplus of farm produce and to provide the farmers 
with valuable goods in exchange for their products 
from the land. 
The continual increase of the surplus 
produce of their land would, in due time, 
create a greater capital than what could be 
employed with the ordinary rate of profit 
in the improvement and cultivation of land; 
and the surplus part of it would naturally 
turn itself to the employment of artificers 
and manufacturers at home.10 
Likewise, merchants are necessary mediators in this 
process in order to maintain this trade. 
By moans of the industry of merchants, arti-
ficers, and manufacturers, the proprietors 
and cultivators can purchase both the foreign 
goods and the manufactured produce of their 
own country which they have occasion for, 
with the produce of a much smaller quantity 
of their own labour than what they would be 
obliged to employ if they were to attempt, in 
an awkward and unskillful manner, either to 
import the one or to make the other for their 
own use. By means of the unproductive class, 
the cultivators are delivered from many 
cares which would otherwise distract their 
attention from the cultivation of land.*1 
Smith generalizes the notion of labor, that is to say, 
he posits labor in general as valuable. Farm labor 
loses its value unless there are other forms of labor 
to distribute and consume its products. Smith thus 
identifies wealth as valuable objects (be they farm or 
factory goods) with the labor that produced them: 
substance (wealth) is subject (labor). Wealth as a 
substantial commodity is merely the objective form of 
the activity that produced it. 
It is for this reason that Marx lauded Smith as "the Luther of Political Economy," for just as Luther, 
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by his doctrine of "justification by faith," identi-
fied each individual as the locus of true religious 
feeling, so did Smith identify each individual as the 
locus of true value (via his labor). 
Just as Luther recognized religion — faith — 
as the substance of the external world and in 
consequence stood opposed to Catholic'"pagan-
ism — just as he superseded external religi-
osity by making religiosity the inner substance 
of man — just as he negated the priest outside 
the layman because he transplanted the priest 
into laymen's hearts, just so with wealth: 
wealth as something outside man and independent 
of him, and therefore as something to be main-
tained and asserted only in an external 
fashion, is done away with; that is, this 
external, mindless, objectivity of wealth is 
done away with . . . .12 
According to Luther, ultimate religious authority 
resides solely in the individual; it is his faith 
(or lack of it) alone that determines his relationship 
to God. Each individual, by his faith, has direct 
access to God's grace (the meaning of Luther's concept 
of "the priesthood of all believers;" each believer, 
in virtue of his faith, is a priest). To use Marx's 
terminology, religion was internalized via this 
concept, in contrast to the Roman Catholic reliance 
upon external authority. Likewise, in economics there 
is no external source of authority, neither in precious 
metals nor in agriculture, that in itself constitutes 
objective wealth. The ultimate source of wealth 
(as with religion) lies in the activity of the indi-
vidual; just as a man's religion is constituted by 
his faith, so is wealth constituted by his labor. 
Each individual is thus inherently valuable as the 
ultimate source of wealth. 
Marx derived the analogy between Smith and 
Luther from Frederick Engels, though there are some 
differences in the way the analogy is constructed. 
Engels contrasts Smith to Mercantilism, neglecting 
the intermediate stage of Physiocracy. For Engels, 
Mercantilism was like Catholicism in that they both 
recognize the fundamentally base nature of human 
motivation. 
The mercantile system still had a certain artless Catholic candor and did not in the least conceal the immoral nature of trade. We have seen how it openly paraded its mean greed.13 
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Smith, for Engels, resembles Protestantism in that a 
virtue is made of a vice ("Protestant hypocrisy took 
the place of Catholic candor"), since for Smith trade 
is justified as a unifying rather than an antagonizing 
enterprise. Engels, however, approved Smith's position, 
seeing him as "humanizing" trade* 
Marx's appraisal of Smith went beyond Engels'; 
to Marx, Smith did not merely soften an inequity, he 
exposed a fundamental truth. The identification of 
labor and value does not merely make work bearable, 
rather it represents a profound advance in human 
consciousness, an advance marking the emergence of a 
new epoch (just as Hegel's identification of substance 
and subject was to introduce a culminating era). For 
Marx, it is more than just a new belief, rather it 
represents the realization of a fundamental truth 
regarding the nature of the human world. 
In summary, this is the position I have tried 
to develop: Marx's conception of the emergence of 
the labor theory of value parallels the dialectical 
development of mind as presented in Hegel's The 
Phenomenology of Mind. Specifically, the development 
is as follows: Mercantilism represents an economic 
conception analogous to Being-in-itself in that 
wealth is seen to be a property of external, indepen-
dently existing, and inherently valuable objects; 
labor neither increases nor diminishes that value, 
but merely serves to acquire it. The Physiocratic 
position is the analog of Being-for-itself in that 
the role of human activity is recognized as integral 
to wealth; nevertheless, this activity is dehumanized 
in that value is still predicated of an external 
object (although it has a value for man, i.e., as 
food) and only one form of labor is admitted to be 
value producing. Adam Smith represents the culmina-
tion of the dialectic — Being-in-and-for-itself. 
Labor, at last, is seen as the sole constituent of 
value; value is no longer objective, independent of 
the individual, but is subjective, identical with his 
activity. 
Southern Illinois University 
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